Single Idea 14587

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive]

Full Idea

We accept primitivism about causation, for how could there be something even more basic in the world than causation, which might allow us to bring forth a reductive analysis?

Gist of Idea

We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced

Source

S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], Concl)

Book Reference

Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.237


A Reaction

I think I agree with this view, and for the same reason. I can't imagine how one could cite any 'categorical' or 'structural' properties, or anything else, without invoking causal phenomena in their characterisation.