Single Idea 13805

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier]

Full Idea

Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x.

Gist of Idea

Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature

Source

Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)

Book Reference

'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism', ed/tr. French,Uehling,Wettstein [Minnesota 1986], p.4


A Reaction

This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence?