Single Idea 12665

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties]

Full Idea

I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers.

Gist of Idea

I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers

Source

Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro)

Book Reference

Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.2


A Reaction

Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers.