Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Xenophanes, Penelope Mackie and David-Hillel Ruben

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
17082 Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
411 If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
412 If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17087 The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17092 An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17090 Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17094 The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17088 Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17089 Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
1640 The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
3055 Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
408 Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]
407 Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]