Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Timon, Vassilis Politis and C.I. Lewis

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11257 The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
11235 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11277 Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11248 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
2975 That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]