12 ideas
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
| 8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
| 8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
| 2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |