14 ideas
| 14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
| 14023 | The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM] |
| 14024 | Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM] |
| 16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 14021 | Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM] |
| 2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 3400 | Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
| 14020 | 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM] |
| 14026 | Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM] |
| 14022 | The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM] |