Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Timon, Michael Devitt and Thomas M. Crisp

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14025 The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14023 The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14024 Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14021 Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
2975 That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
14020 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14026 Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14022 The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]