14 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 17402 | Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
| 17399 | Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev] |
| 17400 | Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
| 17401 | Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev] |