Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Thrasymachus, Wilson,G/Schpall,S and Marcus Aurelius

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
3067 A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
3072 Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
3066 Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
3071 Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
3069 The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
3065 Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
1558 Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus]