Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Thrasymachus, Democritus and David Papineau

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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau]
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau]
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau]
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau]
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau]
Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau]
Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]