44 ideas
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
4938 | Prior to language, concepts are universals created by self-mapping of brain activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
4934 | Cultures have a common core of colour naming, based on three axes of colour pairs [Edelman/Tononi] |
4924 | A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi] |
4932 | A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi] |
4931 | Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
4923 | The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi] |
4941 | Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi] |
4930 | Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi] |
4929 | Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi] |
4940 | Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi] |
4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
4936 | The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem [Edelman/Tononi] |
4939 | A sense of self begins either internally, or externally through language and society [Edelman/Tononi] |
4925 | Brains can initiate free actions before the person is aware of their own decision [Edelman/Tononi] |
4933 | Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi] |
4928 | Brain complexity balances segregation and integration, like a good team of specialists [Edelman/Tononi] |
4927 | Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi] |
4922 | Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi] |
5793 | Concepts and generalisations result from brain 'global mapping' by 'reentry' [Edelman/Tononi, by Searle] |
4926 | Concepts arise when the brain maps its own activities [Edelman/Tononi] |
4937 | Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
1558 | Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus] |