13 ideas
| 21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
| 12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
| 6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
| 19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
| 12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| 5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |