9 ideas
| 20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 20579 | Modern totalitarianism results from lack of social ties or shared goals [Arendt, by Oksala] |
| 20580 | The ideal subject for dictators is not a fanatic, but someone who can't distinguish true from false [Arendt, by Oksala] |
| 5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |