19 ideas
| 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
| 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
| 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
| 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
| 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
| 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
| 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |