39 ideas
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
| 20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
| 20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
| 20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
| 20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
| 20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
| 20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
| 20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
| 20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
| 21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
| 20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
| 21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
| 20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
| 20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
| 20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
| 20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
| 20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
| 5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |