Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theophrastus, Michael Burke and Andr Gallois

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17 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16026 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
16027 If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
20921 How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
5990 Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]