15 ideas
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |