Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theophrastus, Galen and Joseph Melia

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]