52 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |