63 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |