19 ideas
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |