39 ideas
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |