39 ideas
| 1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
| 9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
| 9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
| 9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
| 9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
| 13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
| 9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
| 17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
| 9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
| 9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
| 9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
| 3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
| 9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
| 9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
| 9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
| 9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
| 9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
| 9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
| 1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| 14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
| 1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| 9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |
| 1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |