866 ideas
| 21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
| 1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
| 5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
| 23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
| 17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
| 21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
| 21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
| 21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
| 21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
| 6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
| 14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
| 6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
| 14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
| 7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
| 14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
| 21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
| 21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
| 6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
| 14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
| 5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
| 6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
| 5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
| 17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
| 6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
| 14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
| 21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
| 14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
| 14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
| 14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
| 21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
| 8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
| 14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
| 16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
| 6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
| 7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
| 5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
| 14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
| 14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
| 14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
| 6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
| 14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
| 14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
| 14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
| 14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
| 14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
| 14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
| 14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
| 14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
| 18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
| 21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
| 14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
| 15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
| 14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
| 8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
| 7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
| 8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
| 6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
| 21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
| 14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
| 16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
| 21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
| 14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
| 5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
| 14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
| 14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
| 14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
| 10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
| 22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
| 12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
| 10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
| 6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
| 6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
| 14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
| 18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
| 16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
| 16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
| 16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
| 16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
| 14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
| 14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| 6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
| 10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
| 14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| 17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
| 17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
| 17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
| 6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
| 7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
| 14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
| 21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
| 21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| 16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
| 10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
| 14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
| 14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
| 14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
| 14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
| 14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
| 14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
| 18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
| 14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
| 14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
| 14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
| 14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
| 14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
| 13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
| 14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
| 14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
| 14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
| 14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
| 14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
| 14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
| 14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
| 14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
| 14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
| 14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
| 14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
| 14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
| 14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
| 7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
| 14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
| 14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
| 14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
| 17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
| 10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
| 14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
| 14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
| 7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
| 14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
| 14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
| 14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
| 14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
| 14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
| 9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
| 17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
| 14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
| 13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
| 14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
| 6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
| 18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
| 10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
| 10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
| 23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
| 18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| 21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
| 14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
| 14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
| 11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
| 14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
| 10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
| 21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
| 6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
| 6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
| 6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
| 6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
| 21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
| 21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| 7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
| 14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
| 21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
| 6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| 22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
| 5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
| 9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
| 6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| 21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
| 14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
| 10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
| 14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
| 10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| 21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| 7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
| 21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
| 14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
| 11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 22308 | Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
| 14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
| 22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
| 3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
| 14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
| 16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
| 4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| 7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
| 5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
| 5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
| 5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
| 5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
| 4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
| 5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
| 6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| 7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
| 7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| 21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
| 8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| 6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
| 6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
| 5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
| 5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
| 5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
| 16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
| 16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
| 2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
| 21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| 17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
| 6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
| 5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
| 5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
| 5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
| 21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
| 5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
| 6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
| 10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
| 10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
| 6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
| 14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
| 14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
| 19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| 20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| 21517 | Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell] |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| 20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
| 20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
| 20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
| 20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
| 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
| 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
| 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
| 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
| 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
| 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
| 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
| 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
| 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
| 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
| 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
| 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
| 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
| 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
| 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
| 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
| 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
| 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
| 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
| 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| 21523 | We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell] |
| 21522 | Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell] |
| 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
| 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
| 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
| 21521 | Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell] |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
| 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
| 21528 | Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell] |
| 21527 | On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell] |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| 23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
| 21526 | Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell] |
| 23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
| 23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
| 23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
| 21525 | When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell] |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| 21518 | Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell] |
| 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
| 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
| 21519 | We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell] |
| 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
| 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
| 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
| 21524 | The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell] |
| 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
| 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
| 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
| 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
| 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
| 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
| 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
| 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
| 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
| 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
| 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
| 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
| 14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
| 5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
| 14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| 7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
| 7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| 7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
| 14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
| 14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| 6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |
| 1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 21520 | That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell] |