37 ideas
1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |