33 ideas
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |