Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stilpo, C.I. Lewis and Hugh LaFollette

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
20877 Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette]
20878 We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
20881 The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
20886 Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
20879 Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette]
20880 Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
3029 Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]