100 ideas
| 19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
| 19456 | Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach] |
| 19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
| 6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
| 6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| 6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
| 6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
| 6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
| 19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
| 19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| 19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| 6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
| 19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
| 6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
| 6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
| 6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| 19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| 6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
| 19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
| 6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
| 6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
| 19451 | When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach] |
| 6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| 6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
| 6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
| 19450 | Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach] |
| 19458 | Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach] |
| 6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
| 6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
| 19448 | Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach] |
| 19454 | A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach] |
| 6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
| 19452 | The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach] |
| 6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
| 6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
| 6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
| 19453 | If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |
| 6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
| 19449 | Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach] |
| 6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |
| 19455 | Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach] |