29 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
| 14023 | The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM] |
| 14024 | Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 14021 | Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 14020 | 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM] |
| 14026 | Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM] |
| 14022 | The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |