105 ideas
13773 | For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates] |
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
7421 | A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault] |
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
1649 | Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates] |
5842 | Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
648 | Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
164 | It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates] |
1647 | In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates] |
115 | Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates] |
22099 | The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle] |
5844 | Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
11389 | Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
639 | Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
1652 | Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
23252 | Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
5839 | For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5867 | For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
5069 | Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
5836 | All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
5840 | The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
185 | Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato] |
5070 | Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
5838 | A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
5837 | Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
3017 | The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius] |
1646 | Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos] |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
1663 | By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
126 | We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates] |
4111 | Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B] |
7808 | Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling] |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
23907 | Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
7585 | Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard] |
5841 | Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
1661 | Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates] |
5846 | A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
1657 | Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates] |
1662 | A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |