12 ideas
| 13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
| 13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
| 13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
| 13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
| 13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |