19 ideas
| 17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
| 17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
| 17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
| 17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
| 17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
| 17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
| 17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
| 17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
| 17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
| 17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
| 17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |