Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Speussipus, Ned Block and Susan A. Gelman

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50 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]