Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Speussipus, Keith Campbell and Jean Buridan

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]