Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Speussipus, Karl Jaspers and Penelope Mackie

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31 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers]
The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers]
Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers]
We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers]
'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]