40 ideas
| 8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
| 8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
| 8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
| 8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
| 8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
| 16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
| 16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
| 16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
| 8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
| 8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
| 8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
| 8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
| 8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
| 8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |
| 8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |