Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Speussipus, Francesco Orsi and John Gray

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray]
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray]
Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray]
What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray]