58 ideas
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
| 21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
| 594 | Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
| 21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
| 21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
| 21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
| 22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
| 21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
| 20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
| 21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
| 21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
| 22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
| 22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
| 22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
| 22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
| 21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
| 22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
| 21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
| 22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
| 22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
| 22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
| 22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
| 21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
| 21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
| 21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
| 21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
| 21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
| 21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
| 21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
| 22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
| 21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
| 2632 | Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero] |