Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Solon, Jonathan Kvanvig and Lars Svendsen

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
9307 Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9297 You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
9308 If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
9309 Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
9304 Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9298 We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen]
9301 Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen]
9302 We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen]
9310 The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
9311 We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
9303 The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
1743 The greatest deterrence for injustice is if uninjured parties feel as much indignation as those who are injured [Solon, by Diog. Laertius]