Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Socrates, Thomas Reid and E Margolis/S Laurence

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148 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates]
Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates]
The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle]
Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle]
Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates]
All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon]
The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates]
Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]