146 ideas
| 13773 | For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates] |
| 343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
| 7421 | A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault] |
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| 1649 | Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| 5842 | Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 648 | Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| 164 | It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates] |
| 1647 | In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 115 | Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates] |
| 22099 | The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle] |
| 5844 | Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 11389 | Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 639 | Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 10397 | Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P] |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 1652 | Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 10396 | If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P] |
| 10395 | Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P] |
| 15384 | Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 8481 | The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein] |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 23252 | Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M] |
| 15385 | Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard] |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| 15383 | Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
| 195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
| 1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
| 5839 | For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5867 | For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5069 | Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5836 | All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5840 | The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 185 | Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato] |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| 23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
| 5070 | Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5838 | A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
| 339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
| 5837 | Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 3017 | The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1646 | Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos] |
| 2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
| 1663 | By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
| 4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
| 8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
| 126 | We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates] |
| 4111 | Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B] |
| 7808 | Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling] |
| 346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
| 23907 | Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
| 7585 | Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard] |
| 5841 | Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
| 1661 | Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5846 | A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |
| 15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
| 1657 | Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 1662 | A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
| 338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |