Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Wilfrid Sellars and Arnauld / Nicole

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]