Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Tyler Burge and Jeremy Bentham

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]