19 ideas
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |