Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Timothy McGrew and Pierre Gassendi

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17 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]