Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Stephen Davies and Rom Harr

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S]
Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S]
'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S]
It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S]
We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S]
Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S]
The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S]
Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S]
It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S]
A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S]
Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]