Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Roy Sorensen and Michael Lockwood

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


45 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood]
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood]
Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood]
If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood]
It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]