38 ideas
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |