18 ideas
| 17486 | Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry] |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 17481 | Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry] |
| 17478 | Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry] |
| 17484 | Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry] |
| 17479 | The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry] |
| 17485 | Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry] |
| 17482 | Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry] |
| 17483 | Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry] |
| 17476 | Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry] |
| 17477 | Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry] |
| 17480 | Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry] |